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Audiovisual bindingTo form a coherent representation of the objects around us, the brain must group the different sensory
features composing these objects. Here, we investigated whether actions contribute in this grouping
process. In particular, we assessed whether action-outcome learning and prediction contribute to audio-
visual temporal binding. Participants were presented with two audiovisual pairs: one pair was triggered
by a left action, and the other by a right action. In a later test phase, the audio and visual components of
these pairs were presented at different onset times. Participants judged whether they were simultaneous
or not. To assess the role of action-outcome prediction on audiovisual simultaneity, each action triggered
either the same audiovisual pair as in the learning phase (‘predicted’ pair), or the pair that had previously
been associated with the other action (‘unpredicted’ pair). We found the time windowwithin which audi-
tory and visual events appeared simultaneous increased for predicted compared to unpredicted pairs.
However, no change in audiovisual simultaneity was observed when audiovisual pairs followed visual
cues, rather than voluntary actions. This suggests that only action-outcome learning promotes temporal
grouping of audio and visual effects. In a second experiment we observed that changes in audiovisual
simultaneity do not only depend on our ability to predict what outcomes our actions generate, but also
on learning the delay between the action and the multisensory outcome. When participants learned that
the delay between action and audiovisual pair was variable, the window of audiovisual simultaneity for
predicted pairs increased, relative to a fixed action-outcome pair delay. This suggests that participants
learn action-based predictions of audiovisual outcome, and adapt their temporal perception of outcome
events based on such predictions.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articleunder the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Our environment comprises complex objects characterized by
auditory, visual, and other sensory features that are processed by
partially independent brain areas. The brain must be able to appro-
priately group information deriving from different senses in order
to identify these objects and generate a unified perceptual experi-
ence of our surroundings.
Multisensory grouping partly depends on the co-occurrence
in time of different sensations (Meredith, Nemitz, & Stein,
1987): multisensory interactions are stronger when two or more
modalities are perceived as occurring simultaneously (Alais,
Newell, & Mamassian, 2010; Stein & Meredith, 1990). Previous
research showed that multisensory temporal simultaneity is
important for guiding our actions by enabling fast and accurateresponses (Colonius and Diederich, 2004; Colonius and Arndt,
2001; Frens, Van Opstal, & van der Willigen, 1995; Stein &
Meredith, 1990).
A more radical view of grouping reverses the causal relation
between perception and action, suggesting that action drives the
perceptual processes that produce multisensory grouping (cf.
Lewkowicz & Ghazanfar, 2009; James, 1890; Petrini, Russell, &
Pollick, 2009; Piaget, 1963). Although, the specific role of action
in multisensory processing remains under-researched, there is evi-
dence that actions may shape such processes. Past research
showed that action processes strongly mediate the perception uni-
modal stimuli. Indeed, sensory events caused and predicted by
one’s own actions are attenuated compared to stimuli that are
externally-generated and predicted by sensory cues (cf, sensory
attenuation, Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; Cardoso-Leite,
Mamassian, Schütz-Bosbach, & Waszak, 2010; Hughes, Desantis,
& Waszak, 2013). Research on sensory attenuation has also shown
that this effect depends largely on action processes involved in the
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sensory consequences that our actions produce1 (Stenner, Bauer,
Heinze, Haggard, & Dolan, 2014; Blakemore et al., 2000;
Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010; Wolpert, 1997). Taken together, these
studies suggest that action processes mediate the transformation
of physical stimulation into perceptual experience (Wilson &
Knoblich, 2005). In line with these notion, the present study
investigated whether the processes involved in action planning
and action-outcome prediction also shape perceptual multimodal
grouping. Supporting evidence for this hypothesis comes from a
recent study showing that active exploration of audiovisual objects
enhances memory and subsequent recognition of these objects
compared to passive observation (Butler, James, & James, 2011).
Previous studies investigating the influence of action on percep-
tual experience, generally focussed on action outcomes confined to
a single sensory modality. In real life, however, most actions
produce multisensory effects. For example, speaking produces
auditory, kinaesthetic and tactile inputs. Consequently, when
preparing/executing an action the motor systemmight predict sev-
eral sensory outcomes (i.e., auditory, tactile sensations) to occur
together as a common outcome of our motor command. Impor-
tantly, with the term prediction we refer to the prediction of the
content/identity of an action-outcome. In other words, we hypoth-
esized that when we predict that our actions generate a specific
combination of a sound and a visual input, we might tend to group
these inputs into a simultaneous multisensory percept. In line with
this notion, the unity assumption of multisensory perception
(Jackson, 1953; Vatakis & Spence, 2007; Welch, 1999) states that
sensory events that ‘‘go together” are experienced as simultaneous,
even if they are slightly asynchronous (Vatakis, Ghazanfar, &
Spence, 2008; Vatakis & Spence, 2007). Here, we test the hypothe-
sis that action-outcome learning and prediction (i.e., the prediction
of the content/identity of an action-outcome) facilitates the pro-
cess of audiovisual binding. That is, action-outcome learning and
prediction may enlarge a hypothetical ‘‘temporal window” within
which the different multisensory components of an action out-
come are perceived to be simultaneous. In this paper, we will refer
to this concept as the Window of Audiovisual Simultaneity (WAS).
This grouping process may be crucial, suggesting that the action
system contributes to the unity and coherence of our perceptual
experience (i.e., active exploration would help us create a unified
and coherent representation of the external world, e.g., Piaget,
1963). Secondly, it might be essential to develop a healthy sense
of agency. Indeed, when we generate outcomes composed of differ-
ent features, the brain must be able to selectively bind the sensory
components of these outcomes and not others, to prevent
erroneous self-attributions.
To assess the role of action-outcome learning and prediction on
multisensory binding, we conducted three experiments (one of
them is reported in supplementary material) using a mismatch
paradigm, in which the match/mismatch between predicted and
actual action outcomes was varied (for similar methods see
Baess, Widmann, Roye, Schröger, & Jacobsen, 2009; Cardoso-Leite
et al., 2010; Desantis, Mamassian, Lisi, & Waszak, 2014). Partici-
pants were presented with two audiovisual pairs. They learned
that one pair followed a left hand action, and the other pair fol-
lowed a right hand action. Audio and visual inputs were presented
simultaneously, but the interval between the action and the audio-
visual pair was jittered. In a later test phase, each action could trig-
ger either the same audiovisual pair as in the initial learning phase1 In the present manuscript with the term action-outcome prediction or prediction
we refer to the ability to predict what outcome an action generates. In other words,
we refer to the prediction of the content or identity of an action-outcome. We use,
instead, the term temporal expectation or expectation to refer to the ability to
anticipate the time onset of action-outcomes.(the ‘predicted’ pair), or the pair associated with the other action
(‘unpredicted’ pair). The latter case created a mismatch between
predicted and actual action outcome. Importantly, the association
of audio and visual components within each pair remained unbro-
ken throughout the experiment: match/mismatch occurred
between action and outcome, and never within the components
of the outcome itself. In the test phase, the interval between the
audio and visual components of each pair varied, and participants
judged whether they were presented simultaneously or not. We
hypothesised that learning a specific action-outcome relation
would temporally bind the audio and visual components within
the outcome pair (Fig. 1).
As a consequence of this process, the audio and visual compo-
nents of the predicted outcome shouldmore readily be experienced
as simultaneous, evenwhen slightly asynchronous, compared to the
unpredicted outcome. To clarify whether this multisensory percep-
tual binding was indeed driven by action-outcome prediction, we
compared a condition in which the participants voluntarily
triggered the outcome through their own action, and a condition
where the participants made no actions, but the outcomes were
predicted by visual cues, with the same latency and probability
relations as the action condition.We expected to observe no change
of the WAS between predicted and unpredicted pairs when these
were associated to visual cues and not actions.
In Experiment 2, we investigated whether the relation between
action-outcome learning and temporal binding within the audiovi-
sual outcome might itself be temporally tuned. That is, when par-
ticipants learn the relation between an action and a multisensory
outcome, they may also learn the time window within which the
audio and visual components of the outcome should be bound
together. Specifically, we hypothesised that a reliable temporal
delay between an action and a predicted outcome should lead to
a narrower temporal window for binding the predicted compo-
nents of the outcome, relative to a variable delay. Evidence in sup-
port of this hypothesis comes from studies on sensory attenuation.
Notably, research demonstrated that sensory attenuation of pre-
dicted action-outcome (by predicted action-outcome we mean
the prediction of what outcome an action generates) occurs specif-
ically around the time at which participants’ expect the predicted
outcome to occur (Bays, Wolpert, & Flanagan, 2005). Moreover,
previous studies showed that prior experiences can recalibrate
the window of audiovisual grouping (see Fujisaki, Shimojo,
Kashino, & Nishida, 2004; Roseboom & Arnold, 2011; Spence &
Squire, 2003; Vroomen, Keetels, de Gelder, & Bertelson, 2004),
but it remains unclear whether action-outcome learning can
induce such changes. Strategic tuning of the WAS could play an
important role in parsing sensory events into those that are self-
caused, and those that are externally-generated. For example,
incorrectly setting too wide an action-based window for multisen-
sory binding might lead to erroneous self-attribution of multi-
modal events, in a manner reminiscent of delusions of control.2. Experiment 1
2.1. Materials and methods
2.1.1. Participants
Sixteen volunteers (12 women, average age = 21.28 years,
SD = 3.78 years) were tested for an allowance of £ 7.5/h or course
credit. Participants completed the experiment in two sessions on
separate days (see supplementary material for inclusion criteria).
All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing and were
naïve as to the hypothesis under investigation. They all gave
written informed consent. The experiments were conducted with
ethical committee permission.
Fig. 1. Illustration of the expected results. (Top panel) Participants learned that specific actions generate specific audiovisual outcome pairs. We hypothesised that learning
the association between action and outcome would drive the binding between the components of the outcome itself, represented by the curved double-headed arrows.
Notably, action-outcome learning would lead the action system to consider the audio and visual components of the pair as common outcomes of a specific action. As a
consequence, in agreement with the unity assumption participants would show more tolerance to audiovisual asynchronies when presented with predicted audiovisual pairs
in the test phase compared to unpredicted pairs. In other words, their window of audiovisual synchrony will increase when their actions trigger predicted pairs (gray line)
compared to unpredicted pairs (black line). Hand icon made by Yannick from www.flaticon.com.
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Stimulus presentation and data acquisition were conducted
using the psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) for
Matlab 8.2.0 running on a PC computer connected to a 15-in.
60 Hz LCD monitor. Audio stimuli were presented via headphones
(Sennheiser HD201).
2.1.3. Stimuli and procedure
Stimuli consisted of 4 pure-tones of 2.2 kHz, 1.6 kHz, 1 kHz, and
0.4 kHz of frequency and 4 colored Gaussian patches: magenta,
green, yellow, and cyan. Tones were presented at 74dB SPL. Gaus-
sian patches were 0.38 wide and were presented with a lumi-
nance level of 52.5 cd/m2 in a dark gray background (14 cd/m2)
from a viewing distance of 60 cm.
Audio and visual stimuli were combined to create four audiovi-
sual pairs, two presented in the action condition and the other two
in the sensory condition. For half of the participants, audiovisual
pairs in the action condition were created by combining 2.2 kHz
and 1 kHz pure tones with the magenta and green patches. In con-
trast, audiovisual pairs in the sensory-cue condition were created
by combining 1.6 kHz and 0.4 kHz pure tones with yellow and cyan
patches. For the remaining participants, audiovisual pairs in the
action condition were composed of 1.6/0.4 kHz pure tones with
yellow/cyan patches, and those in the sensory-cue condition were
composed of 2.2/1 kHz pure tones with magenta/green patches.
The experiment consisted of a total of 64 blocks (32 action and
32 sensory blocks). Each block consisted of a learning phase fol-
lowed by short test phase. The order of presentation of the action
blocks and sensory blocks was counterbalanced across subjects.
Participants completed the experiment in two sessions each con-
sisting of 16 action and 16 sensory blocks. Each session lasted
75 min.
2.1.4. Learning phases
Participants were led to learn action-stimulus and cue-stimulus
associations (Fig. 2). In the action learning phases, in each trial they
were presented at the center of the screen with a rhomb (cues size,
0.65 of width and 0.06 of thickness). This stimulus was used asfixation. They were informed to decide on each trial which button
they wanted to press (left or right index finger key-press). They
could execute their key-press at a time of their own choosing,
but at intervals of at least 500 ms, with random and approximately
equiprobable choice between the two alternatives. To help partic-
ipants to perform a roughly equal number of left and right actions,
feedback of the proportion of right and left key-presses was
provided every 10 trials.
At key-press onset the fixation disappeared. According to the
mapping to which participants were assigned, each left and right
key-press generated a specific audiovisual pair. For instance, for
one group of participants, the left action triggered a 2.2 kHz tone
– yellow flash pair, and the right action triggered a 1 kHz tone –
cyan patch pair. Action-audiovisual pair mappings were counter-
balanced across subjects.
Audio and visual inputs were presented simultaneously for
16 ms. Audiovisual pairs were presented at one of six possible
time intervals 250, 283, 316, 333, 383 or 416 ms, after action exe-
cution. Action – audiovisual pair intervals were randomly selected
in each trial.
In the sensory-cue learning phase, audiovisual pairs were not
caused by any actions, but rather followed one of two visual cues:
an empty circle and an empty square (cues size, 0.65 of width and
0.06 of thickness). The two visual cues were presented in random
order and equally often. The offset time of the cues was randomly
selected from a Gaussian distribution calculated from the mean
and standard deviation of the participants’ action time latencies
in the action blocks. However, if the participant started the exper-
iment with the sensory condition, cue offset time distribution was
defined from the mean action time and standard deviation of the
previous participant. As for the action learning phases, audiovisual
pairs were presented at one of 6 possible time intervals (250, 283,
316, 333, 383 or 416 ms) after the offset of the visual cues. We
timed the onset of the audiovisual pairs relative to the offset of
the visual cue to match the action and the sensory cue condition.
Indeed, in the action blocks the fixation disappeared at action
onset, and then the audiovisual pair was presented after one of
the intervals described above.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the learning phase. In the learning phase of the Action condition left and right actions were associated with specific audiovisual pairs. Audiovisual pairs
were presented after a random delay of 250, 283, 316, 333, 383 or 416 ms relative to action onset. In the learning phase of the sensory condition, audiovisual pairs were
associated with specific visual cues (circle or square). In both conditions, 20% of all trials were catch trials in which ‘unpredicted’ pairs were presented, i.e., the pairs that were
associated with the other action/cue. Hand icon made by Yannick from www.flaticon.com.
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group of participants the circle-cue was followed by a 1.6 kHz tone
– magenta patch pair and the square-cue by a 0.4 kHz tone – green
patch pair. Cue-audiovisual pair mappings were counterbalanced
across subjects.
To ensure that participants were paying attention to the audio-
visual pairs presented, and that they learned the appropriate map-
ping between actions (or sensory cues) and audiovisual pairs, 20%
of all trials were catch trials. In these trials participants were pre-
sented with an unpredicted audiovisual pair, i.e., the audiovisual
pair that was associated with the other action/cue. Participants
had to report these events by pressing both keys as fast as possible.
A response time exceeding 1 s was considered as a miss. Learning
phases consisted of 40 trials in the first block, and 20 trials
thereafter.2.1.5. Test phases
After each learning phase, participants completed 10 test trials,
to assess how action/cue – audiovisual pair associations influenced
the perception of audiovisual simultaneity. Unlike in the learning
phase, the test phase involved asynchronous audio and visual com-
ponents. The asynchrony between audio and visual components
was varied randomly to be 266, 133, 86, 66, 33, 33, 66,
86, 133, or 266 ms (negative values indicate that audio preceded
vision). At the end of each trial, participants indicated by pressing
one of two foot pedals whether the audio and visual stimuli were
simultaneous (left pedal) or not (right pedal).
In both the action and the sensory conditions, participants com-
pleted ‘predicted’ and ‘unpredicted’ trials in which the associations
from previous learning phases between left/right action (action
condition) or circle/square cue (sensory-cue condition), and the
subsequent audiovisual pair was respected or violated, respec-
tively (see Fig. 3). For instance, if in the action learning phase the
2.2 kHz tone – yellow flash pair was associated with the left key-
press, then the same action triggered the same pair on half the tri-
als in the test phase (‘predicted’ pair trials), while in the remaining
trials it triggered the audiovisual pair previously learned to be
associated with the right hand action, i.e., 1 kHz-cyan (‘unpre-
dicted’ pair trials). Importantly, participants were informed thatthe identity of the stimuli presented was irrelevant for the simul-
taneity judgment task. However, they were asked to pay attention
to stimulus identity, as they were required to indicate which audio
or visual stimulus was presented in 20% of the trials at random.
This was done in order to make sure that participants paid equal
attention to predicted and unpredicted sounds and patches. In par-
ticular, in those trials, participants were presented with one of two
following questions: ‘‘Which flash did you see?” or ‘‘Which sound
did you hear?”. The two possible answers (e.g., high sound, low
sound) were presented to the left and right of the center of the
screen. Participants responded by selecting one answer by pressing
the left or the right pedal.
In total the 10 audiovisual SOAs (266, 133, 86, 66, 33,
+33, +66, +86, +133, +266 ms) were presented 12, 14, 16, 18, 20,
20, 18, 16, 14, and 12 times respectively, giving a total of 160  2
Cue (action and sensory conditions)  2 Audiovisual Pair (pre-
dicted and unpredicted), namely 640 trials.2.2. Data analysis
The proportion of ‘‘sound and flash simultaneous” responses for
each audiovisual SOAs was calculated separately for each partici-
pant and condition: Action (present, absent)  Audiovisual pair
(predicted, unpredicted). Psychometric functions were fitted using
a (Gaussian) nonlinear regression model (details about fitting
methods are reported in supplementary material, along with mean
r2 for each fit. Mean values for each condition, participant and
experiment, as well as raw data are available from Open Science
Framework http://osf.io/2kab9). Based on each individual function,
we calculated the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) for audio-
visual asynchrony, corresponding to the peak of the Gaussian dis-
tribution with respect to the axis of abscissae. This gives an
estimate of the temporal offset between sound and visual stimulus
required for them to be perceived as simultaneous. However, our
hypotheses focussed on the tolerance to audiovisual asynchrony
rather than on the PSS: stronger temporal binding between audio
and visual stimuli would result in an increase tolerance to audiovi-
sual asynchrony, meaning that temporal asynchronies between
visual and audio stimuli would go unperceived (cf. Jackson, 1953;
Fig. 3. Illustration of the test phase. In both the sensory and the action test phases, the onset time of the audio and visual components of the audiovisual pairs was varied.
Participants completed an audiovisual simultaneity judgment task. In both action and sensory blocks, they were presented with ‘predicted’ and ‘unpredicted’ pairs. For
instance, in ‘unpredicted’ trials the action/cue was followed by the sound and flash associated with the other action/cue. This created a mismatch between the pair presented
and the pair predicted on the basis of the previously-learned association. Importantly, the association of audio and visual components within each pair remained unbroken
throughout the experiment. Only the association between action and audiovisual pair was either respected (‘predicted’ pair trials) or violated (‘unpredicted’ pair trials) in the
test phase. Hand icon made by Yannick from www.flaticon.com.
A. Desantis, P. Haggard / Cognition 153 (2016) 33–42 37Vatakis & Spence, 2007; Vatakis et al., 2008; Welch, 1999). In other
words, when two modalities are bound, participants would show
higher tolerance to audiovisual asynchrony, and thus larger WAS
value. We estimated participants’ tolerance to audiovisual asyn-
chrony using the standard deviation (SD) of the psychometric func-
tion. Higher SD values indicate higher tolerance to audiovisual
asynchrony, corresponding to a loss of information about the rela-
tive timing of sound and flash. Significance value was set at p < .05
for all statistical tests.
2.3. Results
A repeated measure ANOVA on PSS values with Action (present,
absent) and Audiovisual pair (predicted, unpredicted) as factors
showed and no interaction F(1,15) = .360, p = .557, g2p = 0.023, no
main effect of Action F(1,15) = .677, p = .424, g2p = 0.043, and no
main effect of Audiovisual pair F(1,15) = .319, p = .581, g2p = 0.021.
The SD of the Gaussian fit provides a direct estimate of the Win-
dow of Audiovisual Simultaneity (WAS) showed a significant inter-
action F(1,15) = 11.971, p = .003, g2p = 0.444. No main effects of
Action and Audiovisual pair were observed, F(1,15) = .131,
p = .722, g2p = 0.009, and F(1,15) = 1.346, p = .264, g2p = 0.083,
respectively. We then explored the interaction using simple effects.
We performed two paired two-tailed t-tests to assess differences
between ‘predicted’ and ‘unpredicted’ pairs in both the action
and sensory conditions. The analyses showed that SD values were
higher for ‘predicted’ pairs compared to ‘unpredicted’ pairs when
these followed an action t(15) = 2.890, p = .011, d = 0.564. Partici-
pants were less sensitive to audiovisual asynchronies for predicted
compared to unpredicted pairs. In other words, the window of tol-
erance to audiovisual asynchrony was higher for the predicted
(M = 103 ms, SD = 36 ms) compared to unpredicted pairs
(M = 88 ms, SD = 21 ms). No difference was observed between pre-
dicted and unpredicted audiovisual pairs when preceded by visual
cues t(15) = 1.645, p = 0.121, d = 0.228. Thus, participants’ toler-
ance to audiovisual asynchrony for predicted pairs increased onlywhen these pairs were generated by an action (Fig. 4). This sug-
gests that the audio and visual components of a predicted pair
(i.e., the same pair that participants’ action generated in the learn-
ing phase) were reported as more closely bound together in time
than the components of an unpredicted pair (i.e., the pair that
was associated with the other action).
We then assessed whether the absence of a difference between
predicted and unpredicted trials in the sensory condition was due
to the fact that participants did not learn cue-stimulus associa-
tions. We computed a repeated measure ANOVA on identification
d0 for both action (d0: M = 4.140, SD = 0.700) and sensory condition
(d0: M = 4.060, SD = 0.726) in the learning phase. The analysis
showed no significant effect of Action F(1,15) = .319, p = .580,
g2p = 0.021. Consequently, participants did learn both action and
cue-audiovisual pair associations.
We also investigated whether there were differences in the allo-
cation of attentional resources for the predicted and unpredicted
events in the action compared to the sensory condition of the test
phase. We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA on identifica-
tion performances in the catch trials with Action (present, absent)
and Audiovisual pair (predicted, unpredicted) as factors. The
ANOVA showed no significant interaction F(1,15) = .036, p = .852,
g2p = 0.002, no main effect of Action F(1,15) = 1.601, p = .225,
g2p = 0.096 and Audiovisual pair F(1,15) = 2.501, p = .135,
g2p = 0.143. This suggests that participants’ attention was equally
focused to stimuli in all conditions. Proportion of correct identifica-
tion for the four conditions show that participants identified cor-
rectly almost all stimuli: predicted pair (action): M = 0.932,
SD = 0.084; unpredicted pair (action): M = 0.949, SD = 0.053;
predicted pair (sensory): M = 0.949, SD = 0.044; unpredicted pair
(sensory): M = 0.962, SD = 0.036.2.4. Preliminary discussion
Participants showed more tolerance to audiovisual asynchrony
when their actions generated a predicted audiovisual pair,
Fig. 4. (Left panel) Mean tolerance to asynchrony (SD) values for all conditions (averaged across all participants). High SD values indicate high tolerance to audiovisual
asynchronies, i.e., a wide WAS. (Central panel and right panel) Proportion of ‘‘sound and flash simultaneous” responses for predicted and unpredicted effects in the action and
sensory cue condition, respectively (averaged across all participants) as a function of the 10 audiovisual SOAs.
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tions acquired in the learning phase. Interestingly, the modulation
of the WAS was doubly-specific. First, it was found only for out-
come pairs that followed actions and not for the same pairs pre-
sented after a sensory cue. Second, the effect was found only
when the action produced the outcome pair predicted from the
association acquired in the learning phase compared to when the
same action generated an unpredicted pair.3. Experiment 2
Voluntary action control is characterized not only by the ability
to predict what the consequences of our actions are, but also when
these predicted consequences will occur (Bays et al., 2005). For
instance, when I press the switch to turn on the light I predict
the light to turn on immediately after I pressed the switch. In Exper-
iment 2 we investigated whether the relation between action-
outcome learning and temporal binding within the audiovisual
outcome might itself be temporally tuned. That is, when partici-
pants learn the temporal relation between an action and a multi-
sensory outcome, they may also learn the time window within
which the component or the predicted audio and visual effects
should be bound together.
Previous research demonstrated that sensory attenuation of
predicted action-outcome is temporally tuned. Notably, sensory
attenuation occurs specifically around the time at which partici-
pants’ expect a predicted action-outcome to occur (Bays et al.,
2005; see also Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak, 2014). For instance,
when participants produced with a right action a tactile stimula-
tion over the left index fingertip, attenuation of the predicted tac-
tile sensation was temporally tuned on the time at which fingers
would normally make contact (i.e., around 0 ms delay, Bays et al.,
2005). Interestingly, this attenuation was not observed when the
same tactile stimulation was temporally predictable but generated
externally.
Similarly, we hypothesised that the WAS might be temporally
tuned based on previously experienced action-audiovisual pair
intervals. That is, learning that a given audiovisual pair follows
an action with a fixed delay might allow strategic tuning of a nar-
rowWAS, within which the audio and visual components would be
grouped. Conversely, a variable action-outcome pair delay would
require a wider WAS. In the context of action control and agency,
tuning the window of simultaneity might be essential as grouping
sensory inputs outside a plausible action-related time window
might lead to binding the wrong sensory inputs. This might in turn
cause erroneous self-attribution of multimodal events, in a manner
reminiscent of delusions of control.
In Experiment 2 we investigated whether learning a fixed or a
variable delay between action and outcome would result in astrategic adjustment of the WAS. Variable action-outcome inter-
vals in the learning phase were expected to replicate Experiment
1, with a greater WAS for predicted compared to unpredicted
audiovisual pairs. However, learning a fixed action-pair interval
might narrow the WAS, since participants would have a precise
temporal expectation of when the predicted audiovisual pair
would occur. This would decrease their tolerance to asynchronies
for predicted pairs presented at a fixed action-outcome delay, com-
pared to predicted pairs presented at a variable interval in the
learning phase. We did not have any hypotheses for the temporal
tuning of the unpredicted pairs because this tuning has, to our
knowledge, never been tested.
3.1. Materials and methods
3.1.1. Participants
Sixteen volunteers (9 women, average age = 22.56 years,
SD = 2.80 years) participated in the experiment for an allowance
of £ 7.5/h. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hear-
ing and were naïve as to the hypothesis under investigation. They
all gave written informed consent.
3.1.2. Materials
See experiment 1
3.1.3. Stimuli and procedure
Stimuli consisted of 2 pure-tones of 2.2 kHz and 1 kHz of fre-
quency and 2 colored Gaussian patches: yellow and cyan. Sound-
patch associations were counterbalanced across participants. Par-
ticipants completed 64 action blocks. Each block consisted of a
learning phase followed by a short test phase. Participants com-
pleted the experiment in two sessions taking place in two different
days. Each session lasted 75 min.
3.1.4. Learning phases
As for Experiment 1 participants executed left or right index fin-
ger key-presses at a time of their own choosing. Each action was
associated with one audiovisual pair. For instance, the left action
triggered a 2.2 kHz tone – yellow patch pair and the right action
triggered a 1 kHz tone – cyan patch pair. Action-audiovisual pair
mappings were counterbalanced across subjects.
The audio and visual components of both pairs were presented
simultaneously for a duration of 16 ms. However, for one of the
actions, audiovisual pairs were presented with a variable action-
audiovisual pair interval of 250, 280, 310, 340, 380 or 410 ms.
Instead, audiovisual pairs triggered by the other key-press were
always presented after a fixed delay of 330 ms (i.e., the mean of
the variable delays). For half of the participant the left hand was
associated with a variable action-outcome pair interval and the
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half the reversed association was used.
To ensure that participants were paying attention to the audio-
visual pairs, 20% of all trials were catch trials. In those trials, partic-
ipants were presented with either a louder sound or a brighter
patch (13.3% louder/brighter than the standard stimuli). Partici-
pants were required to report the change in saliency by pressing
both left and right key together. Thus, in a refinement of the
method of experiment 1, the dimension defining a catch trial was
now orthogonal to the action-outcome pair relation. This change
aimed to avoid any interference between the task to perform in
the learning phase and the task to perform in the test phase. Learn-
ing phases consisted of 40 trials in the first block, and 20 trials
thereafter.
3.1.5. Test phase
The test phase was as for the action trials in Experiment 1. Par-
ticipants’ actions triggered the ‘predicted’ audiovisual pair (i.e., the
pair that was associated with that action in the learning phase), in
50% of the trials, and the ‘unpredicted’ pairs on the remaining tri-
als. Participants judged audiovisual simultaneity as before.
3.2. Results
A repeated measure ANOVA on PSS values with learned action-
audiovisual pair interval (variable, fixed) and Audiovisual pair
(predicted, unpredicted) as factors showed no interaction F(1,15)
= 2.070, p = .170, g2p = 0.121. Similarly, we observed no main effect
of learned interval F(1,15) = 1.518, p = .237, g2p = 0.092 and no main
effect of F(1,15) = .004, p = .989, g2p < 0.000.
ANOVA of the WAS showed no main effect of Learned interval
or Audiovisual pair: F(1,15) = .320, p = .580, g2p = 0.021, and F
(1,15) = 1.558, p = .231, g2p = 0.094, respectively, but a significant
interaction F(1,15) = 5.697, p = .031, g2p = 0.275. To explore the pat-
tern of this interaction, we used simple effect testing. The WAS
estimate was higher for predicted (M = 100 ms; SD = 26 ms) than
unpredicted (M = 88 ms, SD = 24 ms) pairs following a variable
action-pair interval in the learning phase: t(15) = 2.779, p = .014,
d = 0.463 (Fig. 5). No difference was found for fixed action-pair
interval (predicted: M = 93 ms, SD = 27 ms, unpredicted:
M = 97 ms, SD = 27 ms: t(15) = 0.853, p = 0.407, d = 0.148). Finally,
the difference between the WAS of predicted pairs for fixed
action-pair intervals (100 ms) and for variable action-pair intervals
(93 ms) did not quite reach the boundary of statistical significance:
t(15) = 2.044, p = 0.059.
We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA on identification d0
for both variable (d0: M = 3.678, SD = 0.620) and fixed learnedFig. 5. (Left panel) Mean tolerance to asynchrony (SD) values for all conditions (avera
asynchronies, i.e., a wide WAS. (Central panel and right panel) Proportion of ‘‘sound and
and fixed action-outcome interval condition, respectively (averaged across all participaninterval (d0: M = 3.946, SD = 0.682) in the learning phase to assess
whether participants were equally paying attention to bimodal
stimuli in both intervals exposure. The analysis showed no signif-
icant effect of learned interval F(1,15) = 3.669, p = .075, g2p = 0.196.
Finally, we assessed whether participants attended equally to
predicted and unpredicted pairs in the test phase. The analyses
showed no significant interaction F(1,15) = .103, p = .753,
g2p = 0.007, no main effect of learned action-audiovisual pair inter-
val F(1,15) = 0.975, p = .339, g2p = 0.061 and no main effect of audio-
visual pair F(1,15) = 0.039, p = .846, g2p = 0.002. The proportion of
correct responses for each condition were as follow: predicted pair
variable interval: M = 0.928, SD = 0.122; unpredicted pair variable
interval: M = 0.921, SD = 0.087; predicted pair fixed interval:
M = 0.932, SD = 0.096; unpredicted pair fixed interval: M = 0.941,
SD = 0.084.4. General discussion
The current study investigated whether action-outcome learn-
ing and the prediction of sensory outcomes promote audiovisual
temporal grouping. In Experiment 1 participants exhibited more
tolerance to asynchrony of an audio and visual input that was pre-
dictable from their action, compared to audio and visual inputs
that were not so predicted. In other words, the window of audiovi-
sual binding was wider when participants’ actions were followed
by predicted compared to unpredicted pairs. No change in the win-
dow of audiovisual simultaneity was observed when audiovisual
pairs followed visual cues, rather than voluntary actions. This sug-
gests that the cognitive processes of selecting and executing an
action preparatorily engage a process for multisensory binding of
the specific predicted outcomes of the chosen action. Mere statis-
tical predictability of the same outcomes, as in our visual cue con-
dition, was not sufficient.
These results provide further evidence suggesting that learning
and prediction based on actions has different influences on our
experience of the world from learning and prediction based on sen-
sory cues. Past research on unimodal perception showed that
events that are predicted from our actions are attenuated com-
pared to the same events but when they are predicted by sensory
cues and not actions (Blakemore et al., 2000; Cardoso-Leite et al.,
2010; Hughes et al., 2013). Our study suggests that processes
involved in the preparation of action and in action-outcome pre-
diction, not only influence unimodal perception but also mediate
multimodal grouping. Notably, action-outcome learning would
lead the system to predict a specific pair of audio and visual out-
comes to occur together as a common consequence a specific action.
Consequently, only the audio and visual stimuli participants’ged across all participants). High SD values indicate high tolerance to audiovisual
flash simultaneous” responses for predicted and unpredicted effects in the variable
ts) as a function of the 10 audiovisual SOAs.
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into a simultaneous multisensory outcome. Evidence supporting
this interpretation comes from a recent fMRI study showing that
actions mediate audiovisual object learning. Butler et al. (2011)
showed that active exploration of audiovisual objects consistently
improved subsequent object recognition compared to passive
observation. Moreover, they observed that the active exploration
group exhibited strong activation of motor-related areas (Supple-
mentary Motor Area, Cingulate Gyrus and Cerebellum) during the
perception of previously learned audiovisual associations. These
motor areas also showed strong functional connectivity with sen-
sory areas (e.g., visual areas). Interestingly, Supplementary Motor
Area, Cingulate Gyrus and the Cerebellum have often been associ-
ated to action preparation, action-outcome prediction and other
processes linked to the comparison of predicted and actual
action-outcomes (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1999; Haggard &
Whitford, 2004; Nachev, Kennard, & Husain, 2008). Finally, the
active exploration group exhibited stronger activity of brain
regions typically involved in audiovisual integration (e.g., STS).
Similarly, these action processes might also explain the results
we observed in our action conditions. Recent studies have shown
that action preparation/execution leads to a modulation of the sen-
sory areas representing the predicted outcomes of an action, event
before stimulus onset (cf. pre-activation model, Desantis, Roussel
et al., 2014; Kühn, Keizer, Rombouts, & Hommel, 2011; Roussel,
Hughes, & Waszak, 2013; SanMiguel, Widmann, Bendixen,
Trujillo-Barreto, & Schröger, 2013; Stenner, Bauer, Haggard,
Heinze, & Dolan, 2014; Stenner, Bauer, Heinze et al., 2014;
Waszak, Cardoso-Leite, & Hughes, 2012). One might speculate that
action processes responsible for the prediction action-outcome
synchronized the activity of the visual and auditory areas repre-
senting the predicted outcomes of an action. As a consequence,
predicted audio and visual components of an outcome would be
reported more often as simultaneous compared to the components
of an unexpected pair.
Importantly, the greater WAS for predicted as opposed to
unpredicted action outcomes was found only when the partici-
pants learned that the predicted outcome followed actions after a
variable, rather than a fixed delay (see supplementary material
for a study replicating these results). Thus, prior experience of
action-outcome time intervals, tunes the ‘‘temporal window”
within which the components of a learned audiovisual pair are per-
ceived to be simultaneous. These results suggest a priority of pre-
dictions: prediction of what will happen can trigger strategic
adjustments of perception, but only if when it will happen is uncer-
tain. Temporal predictability overrides the effects of content
predictability.
The notion that prior learning of action-outcome interval might
shape the window of audiovisual simultaneity is supported by
both research on action control and audiovisual binding. For exam-
ple, sensory attenuation of predicted outcomes occurs in a specific
time window, which is centred on the time at which stimulations
usually occurred in our past experience (Bays et al., 2005; see also
Desantis, Roussel et al., 2014). In audiovisual integration, the brain
is able to recalibrate its window of audiovisual binding based on
past experience of a delay between audio and visual stimuli
(Fujisaki et al., 2004; Spence & Squire, 2003; Vroomen et al.,
2004). Finally, recent studies showed that having an accurate tem-
poral expectation of an incoming auditory stimulus can strongly
improve audiovisual judgments of simultaneity (Petrini et al.,
2009; see also Cook, Van Valkenburg, & Badcock, 2011).
In voluntary action control, adjusting the WAS based on learned
action-outcome relations may contribute to sensorimotor attribu-
tion. Computational theories of motor control highlight the need
to separate events that are caused by one’s own actions from other,
external events (Wolpert, 1997). Integrating sensory inputs outsidea plausible WASmight lead to self-attribution of external events. In
fact, this frequently occurs: most explicit studies of attribution
agree that people over-attribute events to their own agency (Van
den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002; Franck et al., 2001; Daprati et al.,
1997), and psychotic patients do so to an even greater extent
(Daprati et al., 1997). When temporal cues to agency are absent,
then an expected sensory event is more likely to fall within this
window of binding than an unexpected sensory event. Thus, plau-
sible sensory events might be incorrectly self-attributed. More
broadly, we suggest that over-attribution in agency judgement
could be a by-product of the tendency to group multisensory
events prior to attribution of the entire group. Further experiments
are required to investigate this hypothesis.
Finally, one disadvantage of using simultaneity judgment task is
that the size of the window of audiovisual simultaneity can be
influenced by a change of decision criterion. For instance, an obser-
ver who is more liberal in responding ‘‘simultaneous” will show a
large window compared with a more conservative observer (see
Vroomen & Keetels, 2010). Thus, in our case, participants might
show a general bias to report as simultaneous events that are con-
gruent with previously learned associations. However, any general
bias to perceive associated events as simultaneous should have
affected responses to all predicted pairs, including predicted pairs
preceded by visual cues (Experiment 1), and pairs that were gener-
ated by actions with fixed time intervals in the learning phase
(Experiment 2).
However, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that our
results are partly driven by a change in perceptual decisions that
would affect specifically action-outcomes. In other words, action-
outcome prediction might have not affected sensory processing
itself, but the interpretation of the readout of sensory areas. Nota-
bly, the brain might prefer to consider that only the audio and
visual components of predicted action-outcomes should be bound
together. As a consequence, participants would be more tolerant
toward audio-visual asynchrony when pairs occurred as predicted
outcomes of an action. Further studies should investigate the influ-
ence of perceptual decision changes and sensitivity changes on the
effect we observed.
Another possible criticism to our studies would suggest that
temporal discrimination was impaired not because audio and
visual components were bound together in time, but because pre-
dicted outcomes were attenuated. In other words, sensory attenu-
ation of predicted outcomes would impair time perception.
However, several arguments indicate that our effect is unlikely
due to sensory attenuation. Several studies have shown that
action-outcomes are attenuated when participants can predict
their identity (Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010; Roussel et al., 2013).
However, research on intentional binding showed that this kind
of prediction does not affect time perception of unimodal out-
comes (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012; Haering & Kiesel,
2014). For instance, Haering and Kiesel (2014) did not observe
any effects of outcome predictability on temporal sensitivity. Thus,
even though predicted outcomes are attenuated, time perception is
not impaired. This suggests that the effect we observed is due to
the fact that action-outcome learning and prediction binds the
audio and visual feature of the action-outcome together.
To conclude, our study shows that action-outcome learning and
prediction can produce temporal grouping of visual and auditory
stimuli. Notably, instrumental actions that generated specific mul-
tisensory outcomes promoted the grouping of the predicted audio
and visual components of the outcome. A temporally-correlated
sensory cue did not promote temporal grouping in the same way.
Moreover, the window of audiovisual simultaneity seems to
depend on our past experiences of when audiovisual outcomes
are likely to occur: repeated exposure to a fixed action-outcome
interval would decrease our tolerance to audiovisual asynchrony
A. Desantis, P. Haggard / Cognition 153 (2016) 33–42 41compared to a variable action-outcome interval. Taken together
our results suggest that actions might represent an important fac-
tor contributing to the coherence of our perceptual experience of
the external world. We believe that this process might also be
important for body-ownership. Indeed, several studies showed
that body ownership depends at least partially on multisensory
integration (Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005; Tsakiris &
Haggard, 2003). Action might boost such integration, thus facilitat-
ing the creation of a coherent representation of one’s own body
(Ma & Hommel, 2015).
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